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Jerome Bruner points out in his prologue to the first volume of the 
English translation of The Collected Works that Vygotsky flirts with the 
idea that language creates free will. This paper attempts to consider the 
influence of the Dutch seventeenth-century philosopher Spinoza on 
Vygotsky. An account of Spinoza's anti-Cartesian conception of will is 
given, to which Vygotsky recognises his indebtedness. We will consider 
elements of Spinoza’s philosophy that were important to Vygotsky’s 
theory of the development of intellect, and claim that an appreciation of 
the philosophy informing Vygotsky’s theory of the development of 
intellect is necessary if the full implications of his project are to be 
grasped.  
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The Unity of Intellect and Will: Vygotsky and Spinoza 
 
 
Jerome Bruner opens his introduction to the 1962 edition of Thought and 
Language with the comment that the principal theme of the phase of 
Vygotsky’s work that dealt with the relation between thought and 
language was ‘a highly original and thoughtful theory of intellectual 
development’. By the time of writing his prologue to the English edition 
of The Collected Works in 1987 he remarks that ‘Vygotsky’s depth was 
far greater than [the early publication in English] suggested.’ As many 
commentators since the 1960s had made evident Thought and Language 
was only ‘the tip of the iceberg’. Bruner notes that far more is implied in 
Vygotsky’s work than might appear evident on an initial reading. One of 
these implications relates to the idea of freedom, that is freedom as self-
determination rather than simply absence of constraint. Bruner goes as far 
as to claim that ‘in the end, Vygotsky flirts with the idea that the use of 
language creates consciousness and even free will’ (Bruner, 1987).  
This hint at a relationship between free will and the development of 
consciousness via the mediation of language is full of promise. But in 
what way might such promise be fulfilled? Many commentators have 
noted the limited development of Vygotsky’s ideas and the restrictions 
placed upon him by his short working life (Van der Veer & Valsiner, 
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1993). The extent, however, to which his ideas have continued to be 
appropriated in such various fields as work on the nature of mind, 
schooling and organisational learning, stands testimony to his originality.  
This article considers the relationship between free will and the 
development of consciousness in the light of the philosophical 
background to Vygotsky’s work. The research involved in the paper 
stems from a more general argument that the philosophy informing 
Vygotsky’s work has not been fully appreciated in contemporary 
interpretations and that this shortcoming has affected the way in which 
his work has been interpreted in relation to practical educational 
questions.  As Bruner notes, Vygotsky’s theory of the development of 
intellect is not only a theory of education but also a step into the terrain of 
fundamental questions about the nature of what it is to be human. As such 
it engages with philosophical questions in more than a merely illustrative 
way. 
Vygotsky made a bold claim in relation to free will: the work he was 
undertaking with colleagues in psychology examined the nature of mind 
as embodied in activity that sustains and constitutes it. Through this 
undertaking he was to grapple with the issue of freedom in a way that 
began to merge psychological research with philosophy, in particular the 
philosophy of Spinoza. Indeed his psychological studies were beginning 
to give real insight into the most fundamental of questions: 
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The philosophical perspective opens before us at this point 
of our study. For the first time in the process of 
psychological studies we can resolve essentially purely 
philosophical problems by means of a psychological 
experiment and demonstrate empirically the origin of the 
freedom of the will… We cannot help but note that we have 
come to the same understanding of freedom and control as 
Spinoza developed in his ‘Ethics’ (Vygotsky, 1997). 
Vygotsky understood that what he was working on coincided with 
Spinoza’s understanding of freedom in the Ethics.  He criticised 
Descartes for his explanatory inadequacy in failing to ‘make a clear 
distinction between passions of the soul and passions of a soulless 
machine’ (Vygotsky, 1999).  He was also acutely aware of the difficulty 
of theorising will and distinguishing it from the sort of mechanical 
explanation that would only be reasonable when discussing machines:  
 
In the final analysis, the question is: does what is higher in 
man, his free and rational will and his control over his 
passions, allow a natural explanation that does not reduce 
the higher to the lower, the rational to the automatic, the 
free to the mechanical, but preserves all the meaning of this 
higher aspect of our mental life in its fullness, or to explain 
 5 
the higher, do we inevitably have to resort to rejecting the 
laws of nature, to introducing a theological and 
spiritualistic principle of absolute freewill not subject to 
natural necessity? (Vygotsky, 1999) 
 
What was Vygotsky hinting at when he said that for the first time 
psychological studies were at a point of getting to grips with the problem 
of freedom in a quite different and empirical way?  
Freedom has been a perennial question in philosophy. In modern 
times freedom is more often than not presented as freedom from 
constraint. When considering the concept of freedom it is necessary to be 
aware that it has different meanings for different traditions. The sense in 
which we commonly think of ourselves as free actors owes much to 
Descartes’ modernist separation of mind and world. But Vygotsky was 
referring to a very different notion of freedom from the popular one 
exemplified by the idea of free choice and absence from constraint. Thus 
to understand the sense of free will that informs Vygotsky’s work it is 
necessary to get to grips with the conception of freedom which derives 
from the work of Spinoza (later taken up and developed by Hegel).  This 
is not easy, since it seems counter-intuitive and goes against our sense of 
our activities resulting directly from the exertion of our will. To make 
matters even more complicated, we inhabit a world in which social 
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institutions and structures are premised implicitly on a Cartesian notion of 
will (Ilyenkov, 1977; Gergen, 1999). That is, our mode of existence in 
modern times has a particular conception of will built into it. According 
to this conception we inhabit a social milieu of institutions and practices 
in which our activity appears as the result of the independent exertion of 
will.  In our common sense conception, will presents itself to us as a 
capacity, a power vested within ourselves. This power (located in the soul 
according to Descartes) is set apart from the world of matter upon which 
we act, as an independent force. Coupled to this everyday common-sense 
conception of freedom is the idea that free will is the unencumbered 
pursuit of the objects of desire – ‘free to consume what I like’. 
Presupposed here is that what-I-am is what-I-desire (my identity is an 
outcome of my consumption patterns). There is little thought that desires 
may not be genuinely my own, i.e. not my own in the sense that they 
determine me externally. 
 
Although the question of freedom appears esoteric in relation to the 
concerns of educationalists, it clearly informs educational practices. It can 
be understood as forming part of the ‘folk psychologies’ (Bruner, 1996) 
underlying pedagogic practices. For instance, some practices of ‘child 
centred education’ emphasising the ‘rights’ of children to follow their 
own interests/desires/wants, are premised upon the Cartesian conception 
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of will. The possibility that will may be thought of in a different way (as 
inextricably linked to intellect) presents an interesting challenge.  
 
The Hegel scholar, Robert Pippin, took up this question of ‘desires 
being my own’ in an address to new undergraduates starting their degrees 
at Chicago: he called upon his audience to consider on what basis they 
might be sitting in front of him at that moment. He asked them to dwell 
on why they had come to study. A free choice – he reflected - or a more 
guarded decision following parental pressure? He proceeded to ask them 
to consider what being free might mean in such an educational context. 
He suggested that unless they have a better idea of why they might be 
listening to him then they had not come ‘freely’. More provocatively, he 
suggested that the reason to come to Princeton might be to find out their 
reason to come. His point was that his audience may not have made a free 
decision in this sense but experience instead a degree of alienation where 
the decision to come is ‘part of your life, [yet] while it was in fact 
produced by you, does not truly reflect the "you" that you understand 
yourself to be and identify with, and so this decision cannot in the deepest 
sense be yours’ (Pippin, 2000). In alerting new students to the question of 
what it means to become educated, Pippin is communicating a 
counterintuitive notion of freedom steeped in the tradition of philosophy 
from which Vygotsky drew. 
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To be educated is also a process of which becoming free is 
intrinsically a part, for to be educated is not to ‘know’ a range of 
positions and perspectives but to understand the reasons for holding 
particular beliefs and rejecting others. Pippin continues: 
[I] imagine all of us playing a version of the game where 
we try to name an idea crucial to our understanding of 
ourselves and of the modern world, and which has played a 
critical role in some of our decisions, some of the policies 
we have formulated, and many of the judgments and even 
condemnations we have formulated about others, but which 
we have no clue how to define and, no matter how much 
we have relied on it, no clue at all how to defend the idea 
from objections. Examples come easily to mind to all of us. 
What, after all, is a "right"? (Pippin, R. 2000) 
In such a scenario we would not be familiar with the reasons for our 
actions and judgments and therefore we would be subject to them rather 
than in control of them: ‘[A] better form of self-understanding might 
make it possible to say that you led a life more "your own."’ (Pippin, R. 
2000.) It is in this sense that education is a freedom-enhancing process: to 
put the point simplistically in Spinozist terms, to know the reasons why I 
act is to be a cause of myself (causa sui) rather than to be the subject of 
extraneous determinations. The responsibility of a scholar to interrogate 
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and attempt to understand the reasons for a belief or perspective is 
developmental to both mind and free will: 
One way of understanding the possibility of a free life - 
"your own life" - is to consider which of your past 
decisions you could truly be said to be able to "stand 
behind," where that means being able to defend or justify 
them when challenged, or even which you could claim to 
understand. "Having reasons" in this sense for what you 
did, having something to say about "why," is a general 
condition for some event being considered an action of 
yours at all, and not having any reasons means it is very 
hard to understand any link between you and what conduct 
you engage in. (Pippin, 2000) 
It is undoubtedly Pippin’s Hegel scholarship that informed his 
encouragement of new students to approach their higher education in this 
way. Vygotsky was similarly informed by the tradition of Spinoza and 
Hegel, in which the development of will and the intellect are intricately 
interconnected. For Vygotsky, intellect is a key aspect of will yet at the 
same time, contrary to the idea of unencumbered choice, it is by its nature 
restrained. In Vygotskian literature, the development of intellect is 
understood as embedded - thus the coexistence of freedom and restraint is 
not the problem that it is in some contemporary versions of freedom. One 
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of Vygotsky’s most significant contributions was to examine mind as 
embedded in material activity rather than existing independently of the 
world that it would come to know. His interest in how ‘mindedness’ is 
formed and sustained by mediation with artefacts in a social domain has 
opened a major area of educational research (Cole 1996). 
Spinoza’s philosophy provided Vygotsky with a different 
understanding of freedom from the contemporary popular version of 
unrestrained free choice. Spinoza’s conception of freedom is so different 
that some commentators have viewed him as a mechanical determinist 
without any notion of freedom at all (Jay, 1984, p. 29) 
 
It is necessary to understand a number of elements of Spinoza’s 
philosophy to comprehend that he does indeed have a concept of freedom 
and to see how this differs from the common-sense notion of free will.   
For Spinoza it is in self-determination that human beings exhibit freedom.  
A free agent is not one whose actions are undetermined, but one whose 
actions are self-determined and self-determination arises only when we 
are not controlled by our passions. A passion here is not the same as an 
affective impulse; rather it is what Spinoza called an affect produced by 
external causes rather than by our own power. We are not controlled by 
passions when we understand the reasons for our actions is based on 
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adequate ideas. To be guided by adequate rather than inadequate 
knowledge is to be free from external determination.  
 
Free will for Spinoza is not separated from his idea of truth 
(adequate ideas). An appreciation of this lack of separation is necessary to 
grasp Vygotsky’s epistemological stance. For Spinoza, truth is necessary 
for freedom as his conception of freedom is integral to his epistemology. 
Truth is the correlate of adequate ideas while falsity is a characteristic of 
incomplete ideas or privation of knowledge. Free will only arises when 
humans are active rather than passive.  In turn, actions which are active in 
Spinoza’s terms (i.e. self-determined) are only possible when such 
actions coincide with adequate rather than inadequate ideas. Vygotsky 
notes approvingly inextricable connection which Spinoza drew from 
affects, thought and quality of action: ‘Spinoza…defined affect as that 
which increases or decreases our body’s ability to act, and that which 
forces thought to move in a particular direction’ (Vygotsky, 1993, p.234). 
This is a deeper, more ontologically embedded notion than the simplistic 
idea that the possibility of free-action depends upon sufficient knowledge. 
That is to say adequate ideas, understanding and self-determination are 
party and parcel of each other. 
Spinoza took issue with the Cartesian conception of will grounded in 
a separation of the material world from a wilful mind capable of free 
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action in relation to it. He ridiculed the common-sense notion of free will: 
‘...so firmly are they persuaded that the body is moved by mere command 
of the mind, or is kept at rest, and that it performs many things which 
merely depend on will or ingenuity of the mind’ (Spinoza, 1993). He also 
denies it: ‘The body cannot determine the mind to think, nor the mind the 
body to motion, nor to rest, nor to any other state (if there be any other)’ 
(Spinoza, 1993). The belief that we have the power to act in the world 
free from any material restraint of our circumstance was caricatured by 
Spinoza as a metaphysical faith in will. Vygotsky cites Spinoza on this 
very point of contention: 
 
Spinoza most acutely contrasts his thought with Descartes. 
Spinoza claims that Descartes…significantly promotes the 
false opinion that affects depend absolutely on our will and 
that we can control them infinitely. Spinoza says that he 
cannot ‘be surprised enough that a philosopher, having 
strictly held to reaching conclusions only on the basis of 
sources that are certain of themselves [Descartes said he 
wanted to build his philosophy only on the firm foundations 
of certain ideas] and claiming only what he recognises 
clearly and definitely, and so frequently reproving the 
scholastics for thinking to explain dark things by hidden 
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properties, how this philosopher accepts a hypothesis that is 
darker than any dark property.’ (Vygotsky, 1999) 
In contrast to Descartes, who assumed free will without accounting 
for the source of its power, Spinoza provided the argument that free will 
arises in the development of intellect, and Vygotsky benefits from this 
insight. Whereas for Descartes ‘the will’ and ‘the understanding’ 
(intellect) are distinct, for Spinoza they are the same (Kashap. 1987). This 
is also the case for Vygotsky for whom there is no stark separation 
between will and intellect; Vygotsky’s investigation of the sociogenesis 
of mind requires that mind is understood in terms of its activity. 
Spinoza’s point that the mind cannot simply will the body into action and 
that an explanation of will in these terms is no explanation, was adopted 
by Vygotsky, who appreciated that the mind moves and is moved in 
activity. Self-determination is not possible through a pure act of will, but 
arises in (indirect) mediation – the mind is steered towards its intention. 
Vygotsky cites the case of Buridan’s ass where the animal is unable to 
choose between the stimuli of two equal bales of hay and thus starves. He 
uses the tale to distinguish the possibility of freedom in human activity 
through the use of mediating artifacts. In the simple case of an inability to 
decide, a human may toss a coin. No matter that the point is trivial, the 
human has an additional means of interaction with external 
determination; the ass lacks such a means (Vygotsky, 1997). For 
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Vygotsky, following Spinoza, the basis of freedom is man’s ability to 
separate himself from his passions, from the contingencies of nature, and 
to make for himself a space within which he can determine his actions. 
Such actions are determined not by external and independent causes but 
by those that lie within ones sphere of efficacy.  
It is possible to discern this concept of freedom in Vygotsky, as for 
instance when he discusses the sense in which consciousness is just 
assumed by Piaget (Vygotsky, 1987). For Piaget, consciousness occurs in 
the child once the bankruptcy of his own thinking is evident, whereas for 
Vygotsky consciousness arises through a subject’s changing location to 
external forms of determination. Vygotsky looks to the unfolding 
mediation of consciousness rather than its arbitrary positing in terms of 
the evaporation of egocentric speech as egocentric thought atrophies. 
Vygotsky takes issue with the way that ‘Piaget represents the child’s 
mental development as a process where the characteristics of the child’s 
thought gradually die out’ (Vygotsky, 1987, p.175). He finds the genesis 
of consciousness in the development of scientific concepts and contrasts 
his research with Piaget’s arguing that Piaget only sees the 
difference/opposition between the child’s spontaneous and non-
spontaneous concepts (scientific concepts) but not their identity 
(Vygotsky, 1987).  Vygotsky criticises Piaget’s failure to understand that 
a child’s lack of conscious awareness was affected by his position in 
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relation to what he was asked to understand, rather than to a conflict 
between his own childish concepts and those which gave him access to 
reality. Human behaviour according to Vygotsky is neither controlled nor 
directed by immediate means based on pure acts of will, but is moved 
indirectly through the use of signs and tools. The modification of the 
world by human activity creates an artificiality (or ‘artefactuality’) of 
conditions. Within such artificial and man-made conditions volition can 
be directed/mediated (caused), but in these circumstances the cause of an 
action arises through man’s own creations/artefacts and not merely in 
response to external determinations. The ‘ability to conform to the 
dictates of no particular situation, but to any’ (Bakhurst, 1991, p.251) 
provides for human beings the possibility of a universality not available 
to animals which do no more than respond directly to environmental 
determinations i.e. without conscious mediation or reflection.  What is 
significant in the analysis of these issues in Vygotsky’s work, is the 
symbiotic relation between the development of consciousness and 
scientific concepts, the ability to operate actively on matter rather than 
being its passive subject. 
Vygotsky followed Spinoza, in asking crucial questions: how to free 
ourselves from our concrete circumstances, from our passions; how to be 
free, not determined by external causes but to be a cause of ourselves 
(causa sui). A key point of Spinoza’s Ethics was the rejection of a 
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‘disembodied’ will.  According to Spinoza we are not able to control 
ourselves directly through a will not tied to matter:  
[As Spinoza correctly believed,] Thought prior to and 
outside of its spatial [external] expression in appropriate 
material forms simply does not exist’  (Ilyenkov, E. cited by 
Bakhurst, D. 1991).  
We can only achieve freedom by altering our position in relation to 
external determinations or as Vygotsky put it, by creating extrinsic 
stimuli.  
Spinoza explains the relationship of will and conscious awareness as 
characteristic of concepts located in relation to one another, i.e. 
systemically. The more our actions are formed by adequate ideas (i.e. 
ideas where the genetic connections are understood explicitly) the more 
we are determinate of our own actions and, as such, active. The more we 
act according to inadequate ideas (ones whose relations are unexpressed) 
we are said to be passive and as such our actions are not free: 
 
The physical and mental behaviour of a human being… 
may be active or passive to various degrees. The more it 
stems distinctively or creatively from its own conatus, the 
more active it is; the more it is merely acted on by external 
things, the more passive it is. (Sprigge, 1995) 
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Thus for Spinoza free action is not a matter of choice or volition but 
of the mind’s activity as opposed to passivity. Activity for Spinoza 
concerned the quality of action rather than the mere fact of acting: the 
mind is active when its ideas are adequate and passive when its ideas are 
inadequate. For Spinoza, we are said to act when we are the adequate 
cause of our actions; that is, when the ideas on which our actions are 
based are adequate ideas.  This is a totally different sense of action from 
the common one that makes no such profound distinction. So many of the 
actions that we feel ourselves to be engaged would, according to 
Spinoza’s line of argument, be understood as vain repetitions. Often such 
repetitions perpetuate what they are intended to change. This, of course, 
is a standard psychotherapeutic position, where an action that is claimed 
by a patient to be effective is revealed to be preserving the situation that 
the patient wishes to change. For Spinoza such activity, though it 
comprises concrete actions, is not really activity at all; or it is passivity, to 
be precise, because it is driven by inadequate ideas.  
The argument of this paper has been restricted to the influence of 
Spinoza on Vygotsky. Vygotsky considered freedom in Spinoza’s sense 
of self-determination as integral to education as a specifically human 
process of coming to be in the world. The emphasis of this line of enquiry 
tends to be placed upon the general character of education, rather than 
upon its specific practices. Since the assessment of specific, practices 
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depends on suppositions about the general nature of education, this 
emphasis is rather a first step than a final statement. The point of this 
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